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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"[L]ife is regressive", a current affairs commentator, George F. Will, recently
opined. 1 "That is, people with problems have a high probability of acquiring more
problems." This is also in line with the Yoruba proverb which says: When a person is
afflicted with a serious ailment, several minor ailments then feel free to come knocking
at his or her door.
George Will's opinion (which was in respect of a totally different issue) and the
Yoruba proverb best sum up the situation of the African countries today. Most of these
countries became independent in the 1960s. The biggest problem then was
underdevelopment. This remains the biggest problem facing the African continent
today. 2 When the other problems - mass poverty, corruption, unemployment, social
unrest, disease, hunger and ignorance - plaguing the continent are taken into
consideration, only a pitiable sight is presented. In the face of the socio-economic
stagnation in Africa, the injunction given by the first President of Ghana, Dr. Kwame
Nkrumah, "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things will be added unto
it",
3 becomes meaningless.
1 George F. Will, An Epidemic 's Evolution, Newsweekj 72, February 5, 1996
2 See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Human and Peoples ' Rights: What Point Is Africa Trying to Make? Citing
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA 1983), in Human Rights and Governance
in Africa, 83 (Ronald Cohen et al, eds., 1993)
3 Quoted in George M. Houser, Human Rights and the Liberation Struggle: The Importance ofCreative
1
2In view of the enormous human and natural resources with which the continent
is blessed, it is difficult to justify or rationalize the present deplorable conditions of the
countries on the continent of Africa. It is generally agreed that sub-Saharan Africa, in
particular, is in serious economic crisis. 4 This is so in view of the fact that although in
the 1960s, the growth rate of its Gross National Product was 1.3 per cent per person per
annum, negative per capita growth rates are now the order of the day in many of the
countries. Many ofthem are now net importers of crops in which they had been self-
sufficient in the 1960s. A case in point is that of Tanzania vis-a-vis the production of
maize. Also, Nigeria was a leading exporter of palm oil in the 1960s but has since
slipped from that enviable position. In fact, two Asian countries, Malaysia and
Indonesia, currently among the world's leading exporters ofpalm oil, obtained the seed
from Nigeria in the early 1 960s.
Various reasons have been suggested as being responsible for Africa's
underdevelopment. These, according to Howard, include (1) the fact that "it never
underwent an agricultural revolution that could provide a surplus sufficient to release
human and other resources for sustained industrial development", (2) its reluctance to
do away with the "economy of affection", or kin-based peasant methods of production
which has prevented any possible transition to capitalist growth in Africa, (3) the four or
five centuries of active underdevelopment of the continent by European imperialist
powers and latterly, by a neo-colonial economic structure dominated by transnational
corporations, (4) the phenomenon of heavy export dependence on one or two crops,
Tension, in Africa, Human Rights and the Global System - The Political Economy of Human Rights in a
Changing World, 14 ( Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds et al, eds., 1994)
3(5) the imbalance of terms of trade between agricultural products (exported by Africa)
and industrial products (imported by Africa), and (6) the low level of investment in
Africa by transnational corporations. 5
However, corrupt, wicked, and inept leadership is by far the most important
reason for Africa's persistent underdevelopment. 6 Most African leaders are insensitive to
the plight of the masses under their rule. When their attention is drawn to the fact that
their people are suffering, they retort that these people have not started to scavenge food
from garbage cans, as the poor in some developed countries have to do in order to eat.
They are bereft of ideas as to how to solve their countries' problems. Yet they will do
anything to hold on to power. They never learn from their predecessors' mistakes.
A good example is Nigeria where the late General Sani Abacha, as military
head-of-state, spared none of the state resources in his control in his abortive attempt to
perpetuate his stay in power by succeeding himself as an elected president. Before his
sudden death in June, 1998, he had either physically eliminated all those who could
effectively challenge his authority or clamped them into jail. Some of those who
managed to escape are still on self-exile in various western countries. Many of these
people were tried in absentia on various spurious charges. Most of those who had been
preparing to present themselves as presidential candidates in the elections which he had
planned for August 1998 were scared into renouncing all presidential ambitions. During
his tenure in office, the only people who were free to move around in the country were
the government stooges and sycophants who went about canvassing that the army
4 See Rhoda E. Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa, 60 (1986)
5
R. E. Howard, supra, note 4, at 72-78
4general should be drafted as sole candidate for the election. Of course, he kept the
person who won the free and fair presidential election of June 12, 1993 (which was
annulled by the military), Chief Moshood Abiola, languishing in detention for daring to
declare, himself President of Nigeria. Despite appeals from both within and outside
Nigeria for his release, Abacha did not release him before he (Abacha) died in office.
Chief Abiola himself died in detention on the eve of his release from detention by
Abacha's successor in July, 1998.
Citing Professor Nwabueze, Okoth-Ogendo has summed up the situation
in Africa as follows:
[I]t is indisputable that for most of Africa the most visible symbol
of power is the presidency and the primary mode of exercise of that
power is discretion ... [T]he effect of that situation is that the main
preoccupation of contemporary power elites in Africa is no longer
the search for economic development and social progress but the
perfection of ways, means and techniques of survival and the
expansion of opportunities for private accumulations.7
In this kind of situation, the slightest internal criticism is met with the most
brutal repression imaginable. The "sit-tight" attitude of the political heads of the African
countries, who have no respect for free and fair elections and the wishes of the
electorate, has created a situation in which the coup has become the most important
method of regime change in Africa. The resultant political instability is one of the most
important constraints to economic and human developments in Africa. 8 It is, therefore,
not surprising that most African countries have experienced various forms of civil strife.
6
R. E. Howard, supra, note 4, at 73
7 H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, supra, note 2 at 25.
8 See John M. Mbaku, Institutions and Reform in Africa: The Public Choice Perspective, 91 (1997)
5It is in the light of the foregoing that we intend in this thesis to examine the state
of human rights in Africa. It would be the province of the thesis to find out how far the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights has enhanced the independence of the
various African countries and improved on the quality of the rights enjoyed by the
citizenry.
While Chapter 2 deals with human rights in precolonial Africa, human rights in
"modern day" Africa, i.e. from the colonial era, are dealt with in Chapter 5. Treating
human rights under colonial rule and human rights since independence in the same
chapter is to allow us to compare the situations under foreign rule and under African
leaders, especially since the coming into force of the African Charter. The African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other regional human rights instruments are
considered in Chapters 3 and 4 to enable us to know the standard against which modern
human rights practices are to be judged.
It is necessary to point out that, this writer being a Nigerian, a lot of references
are made to Nigeria in the thesis. In fact, the word, "ominira", which appears in the title
of the thesis, is a Yoruba (a Nigerian language) word which means freedom or
independence as "uhuru" in Oginga Odinga's "Not Yet Uhuru."
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
1 . African Culture or Cultures?
It is pertinent to state at the onset that Africa is a large continent with over fifty different
countries. The effect is that there are several different ethnic groups on the continent and
even within most of the various countries. For example, in Nigeria alone which has a
population of 1 00 million people, there are over two hundred ethnic groups each with its
own language or dialect.
With this kind of background, it is natural to expect differences and indeed,
contradictions, in the beliefs and practices in various parts of the African continent.
Within Nigeria, for example, the northern states are predominantly Moslem while the
southern states are predominantly Christian. There is also a high degree of arabization in
the north while the people in the south are more westernized.
If culture is accepted as the "totality of values, institutions and forms of
behaviour transmitted within a society, as well as the material goods produced by man
[and woman]"9
,
it is clear that we cannot talk of an "African culture" but of "African
cultures".
9 Roy Preiswerk, The Place ofIntercultural Relations in the Study ofInternational Relations, Year Book
of World Affairs, vol. 32, 251 (1978)
7The differences have been in existence from precolonial times. Citing various
scholars, Timothy Fernyhough has stated:
[I]n much of North Africa the sharia denied women the right to exercise
unilateral divorce, but in Christian Ethiopia, as in many other parts of
Islamic Africa, either partner could initiate separation. Strict adherence to
Islamic law implies that women could not acquire education or
employment ... except in the latter case for subsistence. Thus the historical
expectations of women in the Sokoto caliphate were quite different from
those of their counterparts in the coastal societies of West Africa, where
women have long enjoyed considerable economic independence,
marketing beer, dried fish, and other local produce. Indeed, in central
Africa, most notably in Angola in the figure of Queen Njinja Ndongo,
there were examples ofwomen serving as political leaders and chiefs ... 10
Among the Yoruba people of southwestern Nigeria, the Iyalode (mother/leader
of the women) was always one of the most important chiefs in the community. This
chieftaincy title was normally conferred on the most successful woman in the
community.
2. The Idea of an Indigenous Human Rights Tradition in Africa
While most scholars agree that precolonial Africa was precapitalist,
predominantly agrarian, and communal in nature, there are two schools of thought on
the existence or otherwise of an indigenous human rights tradition in Africa. One school
denies while the other affirms the existence of such a tradition. 11
Denying the existence of an indigenous African human rights tradition, Donelly
claims that "the idea of human rights, as the term is ordinarily understood - namely, as
rights/titles/claims held by all individuals simply because they are human beings - is
10 Timothy Fernyhough, Human Rights and Precolonial Africa, in Human Rights and Governance in
Africa, 39, 54 (Ronald Cohen et al, eds., 1993)
11 Timothy Fernyhough, supra, note 10, at 39
8foreign to traditional African society and political culture." 12 Cautioning against
confusing human rights with limited government, he argues:
There are many bases on which a government might be limited - divine
commandment, human rights, legal rights, and extra-legal checks such as a
balance of power, to name a few. Simply having a limited government
does not in any way entail that one has human rights... In traditional
African societies, however, rights were assigned on the basis of communal
membership, family, status, or achievement, and thus were not personal,
human rights. 13
Similarly, Rhonda Howard is of the view that the so-called "African concept of
human rights" is actually a concept of human dignity. 14 She submits:
The argument that different societies can have different concepts of rights
is based on an assumption that confuses human rights with human dignity.
All societies have concepts of human dignity, but few accept the notion of
human rights, in the sense that individuals have the right to make claims
on or against the state... Those who argue for an African concept of
human rights take as its key the alleged existence of a communitarian ideal
in Africa. Within that ideal the group is more important than the
individual, decisions are made by consensus rather than by competition,
and economic surpluses are disposed of on a redistributive, rather than a
profit-oriented, basis.
15
For support, this school has relied, inter alia, on a quote from Kenneth Kaunda, the first
President of Zambia, which goes thus:
The tribal community was a mutual society. It was organized to satisfy
the basic human needs of all its members... individualism was
discouraged. . . Human need was the supreme criterion of behaviour. .
.
social harmony was a vital necessity... Chiefs and tribal elders...
adjudicated between conflicting parties... and took whatever action was
necessary to strengthen the fabric of social life. 16
12
J. Donnelly, The "Right to Development" : How Not to Link Human Rights and Development in Africa,
in Human Rights and Development in Africa, 261, 268 (Claude E. Welch, Jr., et al., eds., 1984)
13
J. Donnelly, supra, note 12, 269
14 Rhonda E. Howard, supra, note 4, at 18
15
R. E. Howard, supra, note 4, at 17-18
16 Kenneth D. Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa (1966), 24-25. Quoted in R.E. Howard, supra, note 4, at 18.
9As far as this school was concerned, precolonial Africa never provided for
claims to rights such as the protection of human life and dignity in terms of human
rights. It is only the emergence of Africa into "the capitalist world economy, albeit in a
subordinate role, that has created a new and individual 'modern man and woman',
physically removed from family and local community and reaching for protection, often
in new urban contexts, beyond these primary effective and supportive ties to new
concepts of human rights." 17 Among the scholars in the other school affirming the
existence of traditional African human rights is Lakshman Marasinghe who in fact
asserts that these traditional human rights are more enduring than human rights in the
western sense. He writes:
Constitutions protecting human rights can be ended, suspended, or
amended. The extended family, on the other hand, is a permanent
institution which must exist as long as the individuals who form a part of
it exist. To that extent the vulnerability of the traditional conceptions of
human rights is minimized. . . it is important to recognize that the values
we embody within our own conceptions of human rights are identical
with the value system which traditional societies endeavor to protect
through their conceptions of human rights. But there is one difference:
While our conceptions are guaranteed to the extent to which our rules
guarantee them through tightly drafted constitutional documents, theirs
becomes institutionalized as an essential part of their own social
organization which guarantees their existence in society. This makes
their conceptions of rights less vulnerable and more permanent than
ours.
18
Howard also quotes the contention by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (Njamaa: Essays on
Socialism, 1968, 1 1) that "the idea of 'class' or 'caste' was non-existent in African society. The
foundation, and the objective, of African socialism (communalism) is the extended family." The idea
actually existed in some African societies, e.g. the Igbos of Nigeria.
17
T. Fernyhough, supra, note 10, 39
18
L. Marasinghe, Traditional Conceptions ofHuman Rights in Africa, in Human Rights and
Development in Africa, 43-44 (C. E. Welch, Jr., et al., eds., 1984).
10
Another scholar in this school, Lateef Adegbite, has rated the quality of the
human rights enjoyed in precolonial Africa much higher than that enjoyed in modern
times. 19
Stressing the communal nature of the rights, Chris Mojekwu states:
The concept of human rights in Africa was fundamentally based on
ascribed status... One who had lost his membership in a social unit or
one who did not belong - an outcast or a stranger - lived outside the
range of human rights protection by the social unit. 20
It is clear that both schools agree on the communal nature of precolonial African
rights. Fernyhough is of the view that, on this basis, the argument of the school, which
denies the existence of African rights, is more consistent with the generally accepted
theory of human rights. He opines:
The strength of their argument is that they place the source of human
rights exactly where it belongs, with the individual, not the
collective...The alternative, as many Africans believe, is to base human
rights theory on the collective and not the individual. This poses both
philosophical and practical problems.21
He, however, disagrees with the two schools in their emphasis on the communal
nature of indigenous African human rights. Citing two African scholars, Eze and
Asante, among the few that have questioned the communal basis of African human
rights, he rightly states:
My view is that, just as in the West, the historical development of
limitations on government in Africa was a function of the interaction
19 L.O. Adegbite, African Attitudes to the International Protection ofHuman Rights, in International
Protection ofHuman Rights: Proceedings of the Seventh Nobel Symposium, Oslo, 69-81 (A. Eide et al,
eds., 1967)
20 Chris C. Mojekwu, International Human Rights: The African Perspective , in International Human
Rights: Contemporary Issues, 90 (Jack L. Nelson et al, eds., 1980)
21
T. Fernyhough, supra, note 10, 45
11
between individuals and the state. Restraints on state action were worked
out in the "space" between rulers and ruled... Once we set aside the
dismissive notion that Africans based their rights only on community and
kin, there is no reason to distinguish between African and Western
experiences. In both milieus human rights were derived from human
nature...
22
Those who hold the view that the notion of human rights was foreign to Africa
are clearly wrong as "Africa did have notions of human rights qua human rights."23
Individuals as such in Africa have also held the usual rights which individuals have
always had as individuals in the West. The undue emphasis on the communitarian
aspect of life in precolonial Africa by some scholars is a mistake. There is the wise
saying among the Yorubas that even when a farm is said to belong to a father and his
son, there will still be some demarcations or indications as to which part belongs to
whom. The mere fact, for example, that marriage between two young persons usually
involved their two families does not mean that the right to marry was vested in the
family as a group and not in those two persons as individuals. The main role of their
families was to provide financial and moral support for the young couple.
While it was in the interest of the woman for her parents' consent to be obtained
so that it would not seem that she was just picked up from the street, it does not appear
that the consent of the man's parents was required as a matter of law. On this, the
comments of Osbourne, C. J., in the Nigerian case of Re Sapara24 are instructive:
It has been urged that native marriage was a contract between family and
family and therefore that a man could not marry without the consent of
22
Ibid., 50
23 See I. G. Shivji, The Concept of Human Rights in Africa, 13-14 (1989), citing a Nigerian scholar, O.C.
Eze.
24 [191 1] Ren. 605
12
the head of his family, though the experts were not agreed that such is the
case. If it were so, then it follows that a man who had no family could not
marry, yet according to the evidence, he could, and could get some of his
neighbours to assist him; of course, in olden days, before the acquisition
of individual wealth, it is probable that the entire family of the man
contributed to the marriage expenses, but the woman was not bound to
remain in the family after her husband's death... I am unable to accept
the proposition which is contradicted by one of the most reliable expert
witnesses, that the consent of the man's family is a legal essential to his
marriage. 25
It certainly made sense to ensure that a member's would-be spouse was
acceptable to the family since in the event of a problem between the couple after the
wedding, each family would be expected to appeal to their own son or daughter in the
interest of peace. This was the basis for the Yoruba proverb which says that it is
pardonable to have a bad spouse but unpardonable to have bad in-laws. Since each
family lived together on their farm, in the bride's case, it made more sense for her to be
accepted by the family she was going to join and live with.
Before entering into the marriage contract, certain discreet background
investigations - the history of each family, whether certain diseases ran in a particular
family, etc. - had to be conducted about each other's family and young persons could
not be expected to do all these on their own. The older members of their families
usually undertook the task. Most times, this would be unknown to the persons intending
to get married to each other unless there was an adverse report.
The financial responsibility of the family was limited to their son's first
marriage. A man who was interested in having a second or third wife would do so on his
own. Similarly, a divorced woman was free to remarry usually on her own. Since a
Supra, note 24, at 607
13
woman could not have more than one husband at a time, all she had to do was to get
properly divorced and dispose of all lawful obligations to her previous husband. So, the
right to marry was vested in the individual.
The foregoing is not in any way meant to deny the fact that traditionally, in
many parts of Africa, most marriages were arranged by the parents when the children
were young. 26
While it is conceded that, in precolonial Africa, there was no formal and
elaborate formulation of the human rights theory as in the West, it is crystal-clear that
human rights did exist as human rights.
3. A Uniquely African Concept ofHuman Rights?
Having concluded that human rights did exist as human rights in precolonial
Africa, it is clear where this writer stands on the debate as to whether human rights are
universal or culturally relative.
As Harold Laski once aptly put it, "rights" are "those conditions of social life
without which no man can seek, in general, to be himself at his best". 27
Citing various writers, Professor Fernyhough has listed four assumptions about
human rights as follows - First, human rights derive directly from a person's humanity
and their source is the best side of man's moral nature. Second, human rights uphold
human dignity but these two are by no means synonymous. Third, the different kinds or
"generations" ofhuman rights are interdependent and equivalent. Finally, since human
26
A.B. Kasumu et al, Nigerian Family Law, 43 (1966)
27
Harold J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics, 91 (1978)
14
rights derive from human nature, both moral and physical, they must inhere in
individuals and in our mutual need to live meaningful lives. 28
Human nature has always been the same everywhere - whether in the west, in
precolonial Africa, or in Asia. We all feel pains alike. We all know that in spite of the
brave face put up by the cow when it is to be slaughtered, the knife does not feel good at
the neck of any living being. According to Fernyhough, "In Africa, as in most historical
societies, common people had clear notions of individual (and collective) rights as
human rights and responded when these rights were abused by elites or superordinate
groups."
29
The argument in favor of an African or Asian or other concept of human rights
only supports the wicked activities of many of the political leaders in the developing
countries as they oppress the masses in their countries. Human rights have always been
universal. It would seem appropriate to close this debate with Busia's warning that any
attempt to present human rights as "ours" or "theirs" would do more harm than good,
especially when the evidence available does not lend itself to such categorical
assertions.
30
4. Some of the Protected Rights in Precolonial Africa
As noted earlier on, Africa is a large continent and, consequently, there were a
lot of often-contradictory beliefs and practices all over the continent. Although there is
no definitive list, certain rights were generally recognized in precolonial Africa. These
28 Fernyhough, supra, note 10, at 41-2
29 Fernyhough, supra, note 10, at 51
30 N.K.A. Busia, Jr., The Status ofHuman Rights in Pre-Colonial Africa: Implicationsfor Contemporary
Practices, 228, in Africa, Human Rights, and the Global Economy (McCarthy-Arnolds et al, eds., 1994)
15
include the rights to life; to liberty; to justice; to marry and have a family; to freedom of
speech, conscience, and association; to participation in political process; to freedom
from poverty; and to own property. 31 It should not be surprising to find out that the right
to join a trade union, for example, is missing from the list.
There was a great respect for the right to life in precolonial Africa. 32 This is
borne out by the fact that only a few individuals or groups of elders were entrusted with
the power of life and death. A long and highly developed tradition of jurisprudence
based on the Koran and the hadith and embodied in the Sharia was operated in the areas
of Islamic influence. In Kuba society in Zaire, all cases involving bloodshed and murder
were reserved for the central judicial court at the capital. 33 Among the Igbo of Nigeria,
the elders, or oha, had the power to judge those accused of homicide.34
There were exceptions to the rule. One of these was during times of war. Even
during peacetime, the practice of human sacrifice constituted an important exception.
On the death of an Igbo elder, as many as sixty human sacrifices might occur. 35 The
Asante sacrificed slaves, prisoners of war, and criminals, and, ironically, after the
British abolition of slavery in 1 807, sacrifices of slaves on the Gold Coast increased
because their price slumped. 36 On the contrary, Wilkes insists that in the Asante case,
31 Fernyhough, supra, note 10, at 55
32 Fernyhough, supra, note 10, at 56
33
J. Vansina, The Children of Woot: A History of the Kuba Peoples, 150-1 (1978). See also T.
Fernyhough, supra, note 10, at 56
34
E. Isichei, Igbo Worlds: An Anthology of Oral Histories and Historical Descriptions, 96 (1978). See
also T. Fernyhough, supra, note 10, at57
35
J. Isichei, supra, note 34, at 256
36 C. Williams, Asante: Human Sacrifice or Capital Punishment? An Assessment ofthe Period 1807-
1874, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 21(3): 438-49 (1988)
16
most sacrificial victims were those found guilty of capital offenses.
37
It is noteworthy
that Dr. Elias has indicated that the lives of slaves could not be taken at will. 38
The right to liberty was also protected in precolonial Africa although some
writers say that in many precolonial societies, the outcast or stranger had no rights.39
This right was closely allied to the right to resist oppression. In Old Oyo in Nigeria, the
notables, the Oyo Mesi (a council of seven kingmakers), could ask their ruler, the
Alafin, to commit suicide if he had lost the confidence of the people. 40 The most notable
way in which precolonial African societies curtailed personal freedom was through the
institution of slavery and pawnship.
Many precolonial African societies also protected the right to freedom of speech,
conscience, and association. The women of Kom, in the Cameroon grasslands, exerted
extreme social pressure in the form of "anlu", ostracizing and humiliating in public
those (usually men) who had transgressed certain moral rules - for example, by acting
incestuously, by insulting or injuring either parent, or by beating pregnant or elderly
women.
41
In the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Yoruba societies, the only constraint
to the right to freedom to speak and express an opinion was a hierarchy of respect for
parents, heads of households, and elders.42
Even in those precolonial African societies that did not allow for vocal claims to
freedom of expression and opinion, the ordinary people still tempered deference with
37
1. Wilks, Asante: A Rejoinder, Int'l Journal of African Historical Studies, 21(3): 443-52 (1988)
38
T.O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law, 107 (1957)
39
T. Femyhough, supra, note 10, at 57
40
R.C. Law, The Constitutional Troubles ofOyo in the Eighteenth Century, Journal of African History
12(1): 25-44 (1971)
41
E. Ritzenthaler, The Fon of Bafut, 98-101 (1967)
42
L. Marasinghe, supra, note 1 8, at 32-45
17
healthy defiance as embodied in a proverb from the strictly hierarchical society of
highland Abyssinia: "The wise man bows low to the great lord and silently farts."43
There was also the right, in precolonial Africa, to marry and have a family.
Among the customs in this area were polygamy and the inheritance of widows by
members of the deceased husband's lineage. Some of the customs have been
discontinued in some parts. For example, under Nigerian law, widow inheritance has
been held to be contrary to "natural justice, equity, and good conscience."44
Apart from the efforts made by states and households to demonstrate their
concern for impoverished subjects and kinsmen, the extended family system was also
used to protect people's right to freedom from poverty in precolonial African societies.
In fact, the practice of widow inheritance was a form of social assistance meant to
protect the bereaved wife and children. It is, therefore, easy to understand why in many
African languages, the word "poor", as among the Chewa of Malawi, implies lack of kin
and friends. 45
From the foregoing, it would be easy to know how "African" the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is. We shall be examining the charter in the next
chapter.
43 A. Hoben, Social Stratification in Traditional Amhara Society, in Social Stratification in Africa (A.
Tudenetal,212, 1970)
44
L. Marasinghe, supra, note 1 8, at 40
45
J. Iliffe, The African Poor: A History, 7 (1987)
CHAPTER III
THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS
1 . Historical Background
The birth of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (the Banjul
Charter)46 can be traced back to 1961 when African jurists meeting in Lagos, Nigeria
under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists (I.C.J.) suggested an
African Human Rights Charter under which would be created a court to which
individuals or groups could have recourse.47 Jurists from French-speaking African
states made a similar call in Dakar, Senegal in 1967.48 Later, the African Bar
Association proposed the establishment of a commission on human rights to operate
along the same lines as Amnesty International in London and the International
Commission of Jurists in Geneva.
In 1967, at the 23rd session of the Commission on Human Rights, Nigeria
proposed that the United Nations establish regional commissions where none existed.
An eleven-member ad hoc study group recommended that such commissions should be
established by members of each region and not imposed from outside.49 At the
commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration ofHuman
Rights in Teheran, Iran in 1968, Nigeria renewed its campaign for the establishment of
46 Adopted on 27th June, 1981. Cf. OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5; reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); 27
I.C.J.Rev. 76 ( 1 98 1 ); see also U.O. Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights, 11
A.J.I.L. 902 (October, 1983)
47
1.C.J., An International Charter on the Rule ofLaw (1961)
48
Bull. I.C. J., No. 29, 1, March, 1967
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regional commissions. 50 The Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) summit held in
July 1979 resolved that the Secretary-General should set the process in motion for a
commission on human rights, and a UN seminar in Monrovia, Liberia attended by thirty
African states later in the same year produced a draft for the O.A.U. Working
Committee that was established. 51 In three meetings, held once in Dakar in 1979 and
twice in Banjul, Gambia in 1980 and 1981, the last attended by O.A.U. ministers, the
final draft was produced. The final draft was adopted unanimously by the O.A.U. heads
of state at the summit conference in Nairobi, Kenya in June 1981.
In accordance with Article 63(3) of the Charter, the African Charter on Human
and People's Rights came into force on October 21, 1986, three months after the
Secretary-General received the instrument of ratification or adherence to the Charter of
the twenty-sixth member-state of the O.A.U.
It is noteworthy that for various reasons, the issue of human rights observance
did not occupy an important position on the political agenda of most African states and,
indeed, the O.A.U. in the 1960s and 1970s. Most member-states had just gained
independence and were more concerned with the total liberation of Africa from colonial
rule. Member-states also rigidly adhered to the principle of non-interference in the
international affairs of other countries. President Sekou Toure once asserted that the
49 UN Doc. E/CN.4/966, paras. 41-44 (1968)
50
In spite of her poor human rights record, Nigeria's leading role on this issue could be explained by the
fact that late Dr. T.O. Elias, later President of the World Court, was her Attorney-General and Minister of
Justice during the period. In that capacity, Dr. Elias had been closely connected with the preparation of
the background papers for the conferences in 1961, 1967, and 1968.
51 UN Seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Special Reference
to Africa, Monrovia, 10-21 September 1979, UN Doc. ST/HR/SER.A/4 (1979). See Commission to
Study the Organization of Peace, 29th Report, Regional Protection and Promotion of Human Rights in
Africa (1980).
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O.A.U. was not "a tribunal which could sit in judgment on any member-state's internal
affairs."
52 The O.A.U. , therefore, did not condemn wicked African leaders like Idi
Amin of Uganda (1971-1979) who was even once O.A.U. Chairman, Jean Bedel
Bokassa of Central African republic (1979-1979), and Francisco Marcias Nguema of
Equatorial Guinea (1966-1979) until after they had been overthrown. Most African
leaders presided over authoritarian and dictatorial regimes and so had no moral
authenticity to condemn human rights violations by their colleagues. It was also the
stated goal of most of the governments to enhance the development of their states within
the shortest possible time and they embarked on this project with a total lack of
tolerance for political opposition.
53
Certain developments on the international scene favored the idea of an African
Charter on Human and People's Rights. 54 These included the emphasis that President
Carter placed on human rights in the international relations of the United States, the
emphasis placed on respect for human rights in the Helsinki Final Act of 1 975 which
was signed by the United states, Canada, and several European countries, the suffering
of millions of people in southeast Asia in the 1970s, with its phenomenon of the "boat
people" which stirred the conscience of mankind, and the attempt, albeit unsuccessful,
to include human rights in the renewed EEC-ACP pact, the Lome II Convention.
Before the coming into force of the Banjul Charter, the basic documents in the
inter-African relations were the UN and the O.A.U. Charters. Although there was no
52
African Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series) 5329B (1979)
53 Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, A Critique ofthe African Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights, 3
1
How.L.J. 643,645(1988)
54 U.O. Umozurike, supra, note 46
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African regional instrument specifically dealing with human rights, the O.A.U.
Charter,
55
in Article II, affirms commitment to the United Nations Charter and the
Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights. Also, most African states, in their capacities as
members of the United Nations, had ratified the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which, together with the Optional Protocol to the latter Covenant and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, make up the International Bill ofHuman Rights
(UNCHR1987). 56
The Banjul Charter was specifically geared towards reflecting the African
conception of human rights. As President Senghor of Senegal admonished the
committee of experts who drafted the Charter:
As Africans, we shall neither copy nor strive for originality for the sake
of originality. We must show imagination and effectiveness. We will
get inspiration from our beautiful and positive traditions. Therefore, you
must keep consistently in mind our values of civilization and the real
needs of Africa. 57
It necessarily follows, therefore, that the Charter has certain characteristics. 58 It
recognizes the importance of the principles of non-discrimination both as between
individuals and as between peoples. Unlike previous regional charters, it specifies the
duties of the individual toward the community in which he lives, more particularly
toward the family and state. The Charter pays special attention to values and morals in
55 Charter of the Organization of African Unity, adopted 23 rd May 1963; 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (1963);
reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 766 (1963)
56 H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, supra, note 2
57 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/5. Meeting of 28 th November, 1979 held in Dakar.
58 See generally B.O. Okere, The Protection ofHuman Rights in Africa and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples
' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American Systems, Human
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African societies. It emphasizes the importance of economic, social, and cultural rights,
especially the right to development. However, as we shall see later in this thesis, some
of these measures are not far-reaching enough.
2. Rights and Duties under the Banjul Charter
The Banjul Charter is divided into the Preamble and three other parts: "Rights
and Duties," "Measures of Safeguard," and "General Provisions." Chapter 1 of Part I
contains what are described as human and people's rights, while Chapter 2 deals with
the individual's duties to the society at large as well as to the state in particular.
Although the Charter does not distinguish between "human" and "peoples" rights, it is
generally accepted that it regards what others refer to as first- and second-generation
human rights — i.e., political/civil and economic/cultural/social rights ~ as forming the
essential core of the former, and some modified forms of the rights of the third
generation — i.e., solidarity ~ as comprised in the latter. 59
The conventional human rights, i.e., those similar to the well-known rights and
freedoms enshrined in the International Bill of Rights, are listed in Articles 2 through 1
8
and include the following: non-discrimination on grounds of race, ethnic group, color,
sex, language, religion, opinion, origin, status, etc.; 60 equality before the law and equal
protection of the law;61 dignity inherent in a human being; 62 liberty, security, and
freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention;6" free access to judicial organs and freedom
Rights Quarterly 6(2): 141 (1984)
59 H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo. supra, note 2, 77
60
Art. 2, supra, note 46
61
Art. 3, supra, note 46
62
Art. 5, supra, note 46
63
Art. 6, supra, note 46
23
from retroactive penal legislation;64 information, expression, and dissemination of
ideas;
65
association and assembly;66 movement and asylum, freedom from unlawful
restrictions or expulsion and the prohibition of mass expulsion of non-nationals;67 the
citizen's right to participate freely in government and equal access to the public
service;
68
the right to property;
69
to work; 70 to health; 71 and to education. 72
It is noteworthy that the enjoyment of the socioeconomic rights or welfare rights
like those to health and education recognized by the Charter depend on the availability
of the necessary infrastructure. Unfortunately, most African governments do not have
the resources to provide the infrastructure and the Charter generally failed to indicate
the nature of the obligations placed on the OAU as an organization and on its member
states by the rights created. The following comments made by the Constitution Drafting
Committee in defense of the non-justiciability of the Fundamental Objectives and
Directive Principles of State Policy under the Nigerian Constitution of 1979 would
seem to apply to the socioeconomic rights under the African Charter with equal force:
By their nature, they are rights which can only come into existence after
the government has provided facilities for them. Thus, if there are
facilities for education or medical services, one can speak of the "right"
to such facilities. On the other hand, it will be ludicrous to refer to the
"right" to education or health where no facilities exist. 73
64
Art. 7, supra, note 46
65
Art. 9, supra, note 46
66
Arts. 10, 1 1, supra, note 46
67
Art. 12, supra, note 46
68
Art. 13, supra, note 46
69
Art. 14, supra, note 46
70
Art. 1 5, supra, note 46
71
Art. 16, supra, note 46
72
Art. 1 7, supra, note 46
73
Report of the Nigerian Constitution Drafting Committee, vol. 1 at xv (1976). See also B.O. Okere,
Fundamental Objectives ofNigerian Constitution, Int'l and Comparative Law Quarterly 32, pt. 1, at 1
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The Charter also provides special protection for women, children, the aged, and
the disabled.
74
Naturally, there is a distinction between the rights of every individual and
those of every citizen, as persons who are not citizens are not given the right to
participate in government or access to the public service.
75
The peoples' rights under the Charter are those usually categorized as third-
generation rights. They are to be found in Articles 19 through 24 and include such rights
of social solidarity as the right to peace; to security; political and economic self-
determination; and the right to development. As Kiwanuka has said, the Banjul Charter,
by separating peoples' from human rights does not obfuscate but progressively develops
international human rights law. 76 It shows clearly that there is a conceptual difference
between collective (peoples') rights and individual (human) rights.
Kiwanuka has also suggested four meanings of the word "people", indicating
that there are instances where "people'" refers to more than one of those meanings: (A)
all persons within the geographical limits of an entity yet to achieve political
independence or majority rule; (B) all groups of people with certain characteristics who
live within the geographical limits of an entity (A), or in an entity that has attained
independence or majority rule (i.e., minorities under any political system); (C) the state
and the people as synonymous (however, this is only an external meaning of "people");
and (D) all persons within a state.' 7
January 1983).
74
Art. 18, supra, note 46
75 Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, supra, note 53, at 646
76 Richard Kiwanuka, The Meaning of "People " in the Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights, 82
A.J.I.L. 80, 86 (January, 1988)
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The Banjul Charter has been criticized for its failure to provide a definition of
the word "people". It is also said to be conservative on the issue of collective rights for
omitting important new and collective rights like the one to food. 78
Articles 27 through 29 contain the duties imposed on the individual by the
Banjul Charter. These include the duty to preserve the harmonious development of the
family; the duty to serve the community and the nation; the duty to preserve African
values; the duty to defend the security of the state; and the duty to pay taxes. This was
the first time that such duties had been included in an international instrument. The
inclusion, however, seems unnecessary.
Apart from the duties imposed on individuals, there are also some duties
imposed on the states. These include adoption of legislative or other measures to give
effect to the Charter,
79
protection of the health of their people, 80 elimination of
discrimination against women, protection ofwomen and children,81 protection of the
physical and moral health of the family, 82 guarantee of the independence of the
judiciary,83 the exercise of the right to development,84 and promotion, through teaching,
education, and publication, of respect for, and adherence to, the rights, freedoms, and
obligations contained in the Charter. 85 In addition, states are to submit to the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights reports every two years on the legislative
77
R.N. Kiwanuka, supra, note 76, at 100-1
78 H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, supra, note 2, at 78
79
Art. 1 , supra, note 46
80
Art. 16(2), supra, note 46
81
Art. 18, supra, note 46
82
Art. 1 8, supra, note 46
83
Art. 26, supra, note 46
84
Art. 22(2), supra, note 46
85
Art. 25, supra, note 46
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or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms provided
for by the Charter. 86
3. Other Provisions
The Commission established by the Banjul Charter has eleven members. 87 The
Commission shall include not more than one national of the same state. Members,
normally elected for a 6-year period, are nominated by member-states. A member-state
may nominate two members, in which case one must be a non-national of the
nominating state. The rationale behind this is two-fold: to have a wide and fair
representation of the states, and to make it possible for persons of high calibre and
renowned competence who will not otherwise be nominated by their own governments
(e.g. because of political differences) to serve on the Commission.88
All members of the Commission must be Africans with the highest reputation
and relevant competence, especially in the field of law.
The main duty of the Commission is to promote and protect human rights
through documentation, studies, seminars, symposia, and conferences, disseminate
information on human rights, and encourage other human rights institutions.
When a state is of the opinion that another state has violated the Charter, the
complainant state must communicate the alleged breach to the respondent state in
writing and send copies to the Chairman of the Commission. If the states cannot resolve
the matter between them within 3 months, either state may submit it to the Commission.
86
Art. 62, supra, note 46
87
Art. 3 1 , supra, note 46
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A state party may, however, decide to report the matter straight to the
Commission without following this procedure by submitting two copies of the
complaint to the respondent state and the OAU Secretary-General. Before dealing with
the matter, the Commission must ensure that all local remedies have been exhausted,
unless the matter would be unduly prolonged.
Each state party may submit written or oral representations to the Commission.
It is noteworthy that the spirit of the Charter is to encourage bilateral settlement of
differences rather than "getting involved". However, when the Commission does get
involved, it acts like an arbiter trying to reach an amicable settlement rather than like a
judge using judicial fiat.
The Commission may also receive communications from nongovernmental
organizations and individuals after the exhaustion of local remedies unless this will
cause undue prolongation. Such communications must not be couched in a language
insulting to a state or its institutions or to the OAU and must not be based exclusively
on news disseminated through the mass media. Personal knowledge of relevant facts is
very important. Whether the Commission considers such a complaint or not shall be
determined by a simple vote of its members.
The Commission shall draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Governments (AHSG, Assembly, or heads of state) to communications that reveal
special cases of a series of serious or massive violations of human and peoples' rights.
The Assembly may request an in-depth study of such situations by the Commission and
reports of the Commission's findings and recommendations. The Commission shall
88 Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, supra, note 52, at 650
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refer a case of emergency to the Chairman ofAHSG who may ask for an in-depth study.
States are obliged to cooperate with the Commission in the conduct of investigations
and to provide relevant information. They may also be called upon to submit written or
oral representations.
The Commission is expected to work in secrecy "until such time as the
Assembly ... shall decide otherwise."89
The Commission shall interpret the provisions of the Charter if requested by a
state party, an institution of the OAU or an African organization recognized by the
OAU. 90 The Commission shall also perform other tasks which may be entrusted to it by
the AHSG.
Proposals for amendment of the Charter can be instituted by state parties only.
The Commission is required to be consulted and to state an opinion on a proposal for
amendment. The amendment shall be approved by a simple majority of all the state
parties - not merely those present and voting. The amendment comes into force for each
state party that has signed it three months after the Secretary-General has received
notice of the acceptance. 91
89
Art. 59(1), supra, note 46
90
Art. 45(4), supra, note 46
91
Art. 68, supra, note 46
CHAPTER IV
THE BANJUL CHARTER AND OTHER REGIONAL CHARTERS -
A COMPARISON
By the time the Banjul Charter was drafted, there were already in existence some
regional human rights instruments which could serve as precedents, not to mention the
wide range of non-regional international conventions which had been concluded under
the auspices of international organizations, especially, the United Nations and its
specialized agencies. The two regional instruments were the European Convention92 and
the American Convention.93 We shall now consider some of the similarities and
dissimilarities between the Banjul Charter and the two instruments.
The three instruments are generally similar in their protection of some of the
most basic and well-recognized human rights like those to life,94 protection from torture,
inhuman, or degrading treatment,95 liberty of the person,96 and fair trial. 97
Article 17, paragraph 5 of the American Convention expressly provides for
equal rights for children born out of wedlock and those born in wedlock. While the
92 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for
signature November 4, 1950, entered into force September 3, 1953; 213 U.N.T.S. 222; reprinted, along
with five subsequent protocols, in Council of Europe, Collected Texts (1979).
93 American Convention on Human Rights, signed November 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1979;
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1; O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser.k/XVI/1.1. doc. 65. Rev. 1, corr. 1 (1970); reprinted in
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser. L/V7II.50, doc. 6 (1980); and 9
I.L.M. 673 (1970).
94
Banjul Art. 4, supra, note 46; European Art. 1, supra, note 92; American Art. 2, supra, note 93
95 Banjul Art. 5, supra, note 46; European Art. 3, supra, note 92; American Art. 5, supra, note 93
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European Convention does not have such explicit provision, the European Court of
Human Rights has held in Marckx v. Belgium9* that there was no objective and
reasonable justification for treatment in which the illegitimate child had no entitlement
on intestacy in the estate of members of her mother's family. Consequently, it would
seem that most distinctions between the legitimate and the illegitimate child are in
violation of the European Convention as being discriminatory within the meaning of
Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8."
It is strange that the Banjul Charter contains no provision similar to Article 17(5)
of the American Convention. Using Nigeria as an example, Okere has sought to explain
this visible omission on the grounds that such explicit recognition would offend against
both Moslem and Christian conceptions of morality. 100 Section 39(2) of the 1979
Constitution of Nigeria prohibits discrimination against a citizen "merely by reason of
circumstances of his birth." However, Section 35(3) of the Draft Constitution had
prohibited discrimination against a citizen merely on the ground that "he was born out
of wedlock." 101 Many members of the Constituent Assembly objected to this original
provision, arguing that under Islamic Law, a bastard has no right to the estate of his
deceased putative father. Consequently, a constitutional provision which nullifies this
Islamic Law would be contrary to the way of life of a large majority of the population.
To the Christians, too, recognition of illegitimacy might encourage promiscuity and
they did not support the provision.
96 Banjul Art. 6, supra, note 46; European Art. 5, supra, note 92; American Art. 7, supra, note 93
97
Banjul Art. 7, supra, note 46; European Art. 6, supra, note 92; American Art. 8, supra, note 93
98
Series A, No. 31, Judgment of June 13, 1979
99 B.O. Okere, supra, note 58, at 154-5
100
B.O. Okere, supra, note 58, at 154-5
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The Banjul Charter, the American Convention, and the European Convention
each provide for a Human Rights Commission. However, while individuals and groups
have a qualified right to petition the African Commission similar to the unqualified right
to petition the American Commission, 102 the European Commission receives individual
and group petitions only if the state against which the complaint is made has declared its
recognition of the Commission's competence to receive them. 103 The African
Commission, however, lacks one important tool - publicity.
One big difference between the Banjul Charter on the one hand, and the
European and American Conventions, on the other, has been the absence of a court of
human rights in the Banjul Charter. The drafters of the Banjul Charter had ignored
calls
104
for such a court, arguing that the formal adversarial procedures common to
Western legal systems were inappropriate. African customs and traditions emphasize
conciliation rather than adjudication. 105 So unlike the American and European
Conventions which give the Courts of human rights power to review cases brought first
before the Commission, there is no such second avenue of redress under the Banjul
Charter as the OAU cannot give such redress under the Banjul Charter. 106
The production of the Draft Additional Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights which, on coming into force, will provide for the
establishment of an 1 1 -member African Court ofHuman and Peoples' Rights is,
101 See Report of the Nigerian Constitution Drafting Committee, vol. 1, at 21 (1976)
102
Banjul Art. 56, supra, note 46; American Art. 44, supra, note 93
103 European Art. 25(1), supra, note 92
104
See, e.g., Esiemokhai, Towards Adequate Defence ofHuman Rights in Africa, 13 VERFASSUNG &
RECHT IN UBERSEE 151, 156-157 (1980)
105 Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 29th Report, Regional Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights in Africa (1980)
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therefore, a welcome development. 107 It is noteworthy that while the European Court of
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights are similar in jurisdiction
and functions, they differ in composition. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
has seven judges while its European counterpart has judges from all the member states
of the Council of Europe. 108 It is noteworthy that in October 1992, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe made a proposal for the merger of the Commission
and the Court, with petitions being submitted directly to the Court. 109
While the American Convention110 and the Banjul Charter 111 provide for the right
of citizens to participate in government, the European Convention112 guarantees only the
right to free elections. Both the American Convention and the Banjul Charter also
provide for rights and duties.
Unlike the other two regional documents, the Banjul Charter provides for a right
to development. 113
It is also important to note that, unlike the European Convention, there are no
derogation clauses in the Banjul Charter. Derogation clauses usually permit a state to
hold their obligations under treaties in abeyance in cases of public emergencies or wars,
for example. 114
106 U.O. Umozurike, supra, note 46, at 908
107 OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.l rev. 2 (1997)
108 American Art. 52, supra, note 93; European Art. 38, supra, note 92
109 The Reuter Library Rep. (October 6, 1992)
110 American Art. 23, supra, note 93
111 Banjul Art. 15, supra, note 46
112 European Art. 3 of the First Protocol
1,3 Banjul Art. 22, supra, note 46
114 Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, supra, note 53, at 648
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The Banjul Charter, however, contains claw-back clauses which could give the
same Charter provisions different effect in different member states. 1 1S A claw-back
clause is one which permits a state its almost unbounded discretion to restrict its treaty
obligations or the rights guaranteed by the Banjul Charter. They must be distinguished
from derogation clauses which also permit the temporary suspension of treaty
obligations. However, derogation clauses are temporary; claw-back clauses may be
permanent. Derogations can only be invoked in cases of public emergency; claw-back
clauses may be applied even in normal situations, so long as national law is passed to
that effect. Derogation clauses warrant the suspension of only certain - not all -
obligations and rights. Claw-back clauses have no such limit. 116
115 The provisions are typically worded as follows: Every individual shall have x-right or y-freedom
provided he abides by the law. See Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, supra, note 53, at 660-2
116 Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, supra, note 53, at 660-1. See also Gittleman, The African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22 Va.J.Int'L. 667, 712 (Summer, 1982).
CHAPTER V
THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN AFRICA
1 . Human Rights during the Colonial Period
Having discussed the human rights situation in precolonial Africa in Chapter II,
we will now briefly examine the state of human rights during the period of colonial rule
in Africa.
In their quest to exploit the resources of the New World, and with the active
connivance of the Church, the European powers transported millions of Africans taken
as slaves to North and South America. It was only after a sufficient number of Africans
had been taken over there that the Church turned against the slave trade.
The parties to the Treaty of Paris 1814 agreed to suppress "the sin of the slave
trade" while the Congress ofVienna 1815 conceded that the slave trade was "repugnant
to the principles of humanity and of universal morality." The European powers then
started to occupy different parts of Africa.
With the signing of the Berlin Treaty of 1885, which was the first multilateral
treaty that recognized the illegality of the slave trade, the European powers were able to
agree on the modalities for partitioning and colonizing the unoccupied parts of Africa.
This step formally signaled the beginning of the scramble for Africa. The treaty also
provided for some limited protection of human rights:
34
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All the powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid
territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native
tribes, and to care for the improvement of their moral and material well-
being, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the Slave
Trade. They shall, without distinction of creed or nation protect and
favour all religious, scientific, or charitable institutions and undertakings
created and organised for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the
natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization. 11
Some writers have suggested that the improvement of the moral and material
well-being of Africans was the fundamental purpose of European expansionism. 118
However. Professor Umozurike insists that "there can be no doubt that profits and
territories were the driving motor." 119 The European powers adopted various
administrative styles in achieving their goal of exploiting the resources of the continent.
In fact it has been said that the British policy of Indirect Rule incubated apartheid in
South Africa.*'' Under the Indirect Rule policy, the British colonial administrators ruled
through local chiefs and. where none existed, warrant chiefs appointed by the
administrators. The policy relied hea\ily on divide-and-rule tactics.
The quality of the human rights permitted the Africans was. however, lower than
what obtained in the European administrators' home countries. Also, those rights were
allowed as long as the Africans did not challenge colonial domination. Despite the
provision of .Article 421 of the treaty of Versailles for the application of the
International Labor Organization Conventions in the colonial territories, those
" An. IV. Berlin Treats of 1885
1:8 P.M. Mitchell. Africa and the West, in Historical Perspective Today. 12 (C.G. Hainer. ed.. 1959):
Lucas. The Partition and Colonization of Africa. 97-8 (1992); A. Cohen. British Policy in Changing
Africa. 13(1959)
;:9 U.O. Umozurike. The African Charter on Human and Peoples" Rights. 20 (1997)
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conventions were largely excluded from the territories and forced labor was rampant,
especially in the French colonies.
In his letter to the Secretary of State in London urging the enactment of the
Seditious Offences Ordinance of 1909 which was one of the predecessors of the
Nigerian sedition law, the then colonial governor of Nigeria, Egerton, had contended
that such a legislation would give the government "power ... to punish publications and
speeches designed to inflame an excitable and ignorant populace, the bulk ofwhom are
absolutely under the control of Headmen and Chiefs who themselves have only recently
emerged from barbarism and are still actuated by the traditions of their race." 121
The immediate reason for the enactment of the Ordinance was the publication of
a pamphlet entitled "Governor Egerton and the Railways" by frontline nationalist
Herbert Macaulay. In the pamphlet, of which Macaulay sold 1,000 copies, Egerton was
accused, among other things, of disregard for serious allegations of scandals in the
railways, refusing to prosecute one friend of his who was allegedly involved in the
scandals, and expropriation of land. 122
Winston Churchill, as Prime Minister of Britain, sought to exclude the
application of the Atlantic Charter of 1941 to British colonial subjects. In that charter,
he and President Roosevelt of the United States had proclaimed the right of all peoples
120
See, e.g., H.J. Toubenfeld, Race, Peace, Law, and Southern Africa (1968)
121 Fred Omu, Press and Politics in Nigeria 1880-1937, 183 (1978). In Arthur Nwankwo v. The State
(1983) 1 N.C.R. 366; (1985) 6 N.C.L.R. 228, the Federal Court of Appeal (as it then was) held that the
law of sedition, as set out in section 51 of the Criminal Code, was a derogation from the freedom of
speech guaranteed under the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria and was inconsistent with the Constitution,
especially when the alleged seditious act could not lead to a public disorder as envisaged under section
41(1) (a) of that Constitution.
122 Fred Omu, supra, note 121, at 182. See also Thomas A.O. Fawole, Fundamental Human Rights in
Nigeria: Towards the "1990 Constitution", a paper delivered at the 25th annual conference of the
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to a government of their choice. He argued that the charter was intended only for
Europeans under Nazi yoke, which was "a separate problem from the progressive
evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance
to the British Crown." 123
It was clear that without the right to self-determination, the Africans could not
really enjoy any of the other rights. Local chiefs who expressed their opposition to
colonial rule were banished. Similarly, a lot of the nationalist leaders, like Jomo
Kenyatta of Kenya and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, were jailed for demanding the right
to self-determination.
2. Human Rights in Independent African Nations before 1981
Following the attainment of independence by Ghana in 1957, the vast majority
of African states became independent in the 1960's. Many of them adopted
constitutions and legal systems similar to those of the colonial powers that ruled over
them. There were provisions for the multiparty system, the independence of the
judiciary, the rule of law, and the guarantee of human rights among others.
However, the euphoria that greeted the attainment of independence was short-
lived in most of the countries on the African continent as the governments in power
seemed to be striving to outdo each other in the level of human rights violations
committed by each against their own people.
The new governments quickly replaced the colonial administrators and started to
inflict worse human rights violations on the people than those committed by the
Nigerian Association of Law Teachers (June, 1987).
123 Hansard, Pari. Deb., H.C. Official Report, 374 Cols. 67-69 (1941)
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colonialists. They were intolerant of opposition and the opposition was not prepared to
see anything good in the incumbent governments' programs. The leaders became
corrupt being merely interested in embezzling state funds and preserving their hold on
political power. People were jailed without trial. Elected officials preferred to "sit-tight"
and rig elections rather than bow to the wish of the electorate when they were voted out
of power.
In many African countries, this scenario provided the right opportunity for
ambitious military officers to overthrow elected governments by force ostensibly to
correct the situation. Rather than correct the situation, they invariably worsened it and
so, all over the continent, there were many cases of coups and counter-coups.
African governments suspended human rights promising to develop their
countries first. In the end, there was no development and the masses were made to suffer
for nothing.
Greed, mistrust, poor governance, and lack of respect for human rights led to
civil strife in many of the African countries. There was a pogrom in Nigeria in 1966,
which culminated in a civil war. 124 The pogroms in Burundi and Rwanda in the 1970's
and 1990's are still fresh in people's memories. Indeed, the 1970's were Africa's worst
human rights years with Jean Bokassa in charge in the Central African Republic,
Marcias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, and Idi Amin in Uganda.
3. Human Rights in Africa since 1981
Africa has come a long way since the days of Idi Amin and his ilk. Or has she?
As stated earlier, the Banjul Charter was adopted in June 1981.
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As the world moves into the 21 st century, slavery and the slave trade are still
going on undisturbed in the Sudan. No other African country seems to be concerned.
Those ugly activities have only been brought to light by various Christian organizations
in the United States and Europe.
There are reports of continued persecution of people in various African countries
on the basis of their religious views.
Many countries on the continent have experienced or are experiencing civil war
and other kinds of civil strife. When one realizes that even during peacetime, there is
little respect for human rights on the continent, the implications (for human rights) of
the several civil wars being fought there become clearer.
Following Siad Barre's many years of misrule in Somalia, the country is yet to
have a central government. Different groups of armed men control small portions of
Somalia.
The government of Sierra Leone and the rebel groups with which they had been
engaged in a senseless civil war for several years recently signed a peace accord. Under
the accord, the rebels have now joined the government and some of their members hold
important political offices. The rebels had killed and raped many of their compatriots.
The special humanitarian problem in Sierra Leone now is that thousands of Sierra
Leonians are amputees. While the war lasted, the rebel troops made it their practice to
cut off people's limbs for supporting the government. These were the same people that
the rebels were fighting to rule over. If it is true that morning shows the day, there will
See D.A. Ijalaye, Was "Biafra" at any Time a State in International Law! 65 A.J.I.L. 551 (1971)
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be little to expect from Sierra Leone in the area of human rights observance for the next
few years.
In the Congo (formerly known as Zaire), late President Mobutu Sese Seko
relentlessly plundered the country's resources until he was forced to flee by an armed
rebel group led by Kabila who is the current president of the Congo. He is in turn
currently pitted in a civil war against rebel groups who control half of the country.
Congo's rich mineral resources have attracted some neighboring African countries
whose troops are fighting alongside various parties to the conflict.
By the time he was ousted from power, Mobutu was one of the richest people in
the world despite the fact that his people were, and still are, among the poorest on the
face of the earth.
In Nigeria, General Babangida annulled the 1993 presidential election, which
was widely acclaimed both within and outside Nigeria, as Nigeria's freest election. His
action immediately plunged Nigeria into another round of political turmoil. Before his
hurried departure from power to avoid an impending disaster, he was trumpeting the
need for western governments to allow Africans to put into practice an African concept
of democracy. That was a man that came to power promising to respect the people's
human rights and was spontaneously well received by the people on that basis.
Late General Abacha did not waste much time before dismissing the interim
government that Babangida installed in power. One of Abacha' s worst atrocities was the
hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other members of the Movement for the Survival
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of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) who were found guilty of some trumped-up charges by
Abacha's special military tribunal.
In line with the divide-and-rule tactics that he used effectively at home, when the
United States and the Commonwealth countries condemned his human rights violations,
rather than change, Abacha made new friends. He became a close ally of Gaddafi of
Libya and attended the meeting of heads of governments of France and francophone
African nations. The only African leaders who spoke up against him were Nelson
Mandela of South Africa and Mugabe of Zimbabwe, the latter in spite of his own
skeletons.
In the absence of a serious catastrophe, Abacha, unlike Babangida, was not
expected to flee. However, by divine intervention, Abacha died suddenly in June 1 998,
a month before his planned presidential election in which he was going to be the sole
candidate. One of his sons is currently charged, along with some military officers, with
the murder of Mrs. Kuburat Abiola, Chief Abiola's wife. Some armed men had shot her
dead on one of the streets of Lagos and the mystery surrounding her murder was not
solved before Abacha died. Mrs. Abiola had been busy fighting for her husband's
release from detention before she was killed.
It is hoped that the newly elected government of Nigeria which recently took
over power from the military will put an end to the steady decline in the quality of
governance and human rights that has been on for many years in Nigeria.
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CHAPTER VI
A FINAL LOOK AT THE BANJUL CHARTER
1 . Some Pluses
Dr. Elias once said, "This document (the Banjul Charter) should be like a lady's
skirt. Long enough to cover the subject-matter; but short enough to be interesting." 125
True to Dr. Elias' admonition, the Banjul Charter has generated a lot of interest among
international human rights scholars.
It is a unique African contribution to the human rights discourse. It is something
of which Africans can be truly proud. It is one of the only three regional human rights
charters in existence. Europe and the Americas are the only other continents with such
documents. Even Asia, where about half of the world's population live, does not have
one.
The stipulation of the duties owed by the individual, the express incorporation of
the phrase "peoples' rights" in the title, the provision for the third-generation rights, and
the special attention paid to the values and communal nature of African societies are
very interesting issues.
Also, in spite of its many deficiencies, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights has not been totally idle. For example, it found in Constitutional Rights
125 Quoted in CM. Peter, Human Rights in Africa: A Comparative Study of the African Human and
Peoples' Rights Charter and the New Tanzanian Bill of Rights, 1 (1990)
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Project v. Nigeria (in respect ofWahab Akanmu and others) 126 and in Constitutional
Rights Project v. Nigeria (in respect ofZamani Lekwot and others) 121 that trial by a
tribunal that includes Army and police personnel under a law that excludes the right of
appeal to a court of law contravened Article 7 of the Banjul Charter, making the trial
null and void under the Charter.
2. Some Problems
However, it seems that the Banjul Charter is just the manifestation of a
conspiracy between the ruling class and the academics in Africa. Since the African
leaders adopted the Charter, they have not bothered seriously to respect its provisions.
At any rate, to them, "people" refers to the state. Still exhibiting the mentality of the
Kings of France during the "ancien regime", most African leaders believe that the state
and the head of state are one and the same. Meanwhile, the academics are free to go to
conferences on other continents proclaiming Africa's unique contributions to
international human rights law.
The important question is "Have the masses in Africa fared any better since the
coming into force of the Banjul Charter?" The answer seems to be an emphatic "No".
Africa still has the highest level of disease, hunger, ignorance, poverty,
unemployment, underdevelopment, and human rights violations in the world. Most
African governments have nothing to do with the rural areas of their countries and the
people who live there apart from exploiting the mineral resources that may be available
126 Case No. 60/91
127 Case No. 87/93
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there. The situation is such that it is convenient for other continents to trace the origin of
every conceivable disease to Africa.
For Africa to be taken seriously on the issue of human rights, the leaders on the
continent will have to adopt a humane attitude to the task of governing their own people
as well as to the Banjul Charter. Their track record so far provides nothing to write
home about. In fact, the Organization of African Unity has been described as little more
than an organization for the protection of rights of heads of state. 128 If the Banjul Charter
had not been drafted in a manner that placed a lot of emphasis on the rights of the states,
the heads of state would not have adopted it. As Professor Howard has rightly observed,
"One way to preserve the rights of heads of state is to preserve the states they head." 129
3. The Reports
Article 62 of the Banjul Charter mandates each country to "undertake to submit
every two years ... a report on the legislative and other measures taken with a view to
giving effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter." As of early
1994, only 15 states out of 50 ratifying states had submitted reports. 130 The only good
thing about this sad state of affairs is that the Commission has learnt to lean on the more
reliable reports submitted by the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The states
will have to take their reporting obligations more seriously.
128 Olajide Aluko, The Organization of African Unity and Human Rights, The Round Table, 234, 240
(July, 1981)
129 Rhoda E. Howard, supra, note 4, at 5
130 Claude E. Welch, Jr., Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Roles and Strategies ofNon-Governmental
Organizations, 155 (1995)
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4. The Communal Nature of African Societies
A lot has been said about the communal nature of African societies. As we noted
in Chapter II, this has misled some writers into thinking that there were no human rights
in precolonial Africa and that only group rights were available. The communal nature
did not in any way affect the universality of human rights. It was of great relevance in
interpersonal relationships and the way everybody joined hands to help each other. At
any rate, this communal nature has been undergoing some drastic changes.
Two factors are responsible for the changes: (a) African countries are at various
levels of industrialization and westernization; and (b) the mismanagement of the
African economies has created a situation in which people can barely struggle to fend
for themselves and their immediate families. The sense of community is fast
disappearing. A lot of people are being uprooted from their villages and families to go
to urban areas in search of better job opportunities.
Once in the cities, they generally have to live like the westerners. They do not
live together in "family compounds" as they used to do in the rural areas. Some of the
traditional practices, like the extended family system and polygamy, have been
adversely affected. Some customary practices, like widow inheritance, have been held
to be unlawful and are being discouraged.
The point that we are trying to make is that the individual in contemporary
Africa (as on the other continents) is, above all, an economic and political man or
woman.
131 There is a need for a free society to enable him to enjoy his rights. 132 At no
131 Rhoda E. Howard, supra, note 4, at 33
132 Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32
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time have individuals in Africa, ancient and modern, been robbed of their personal
identities and rights by the communal nature of their societies.
The attention paid to African values in the Banjul Charter is a step in the right
direction. Indeed, one of the advantages of having regional human rights charters is that
by reason of proximity and shared values, nations can come together to speedily address
human rights issues at that level. Those African values should not be used to deny the
people of their rights.
5. Peoples' Right to Self-Determination
Article 20 of the Banjul Charter provides for peoples' right to self-
determination. The term, "people", has been used in human rights documents in the past
but this was the first time that it was being used in a contemporary multilateral human
rights instrument. 133 Despite the crucial nature of this term as far as the Charter is
concerned, the term was left undefined "so as not end up in difficult discussion."134
The term seems to carry a state-centric meaning at least from the point of view
of African leaders. Their main concern at the time of adopting the Charter was the
decolonization of all the African countries that were still under the yoke of colonial rule.
This was in line with the position in international law which had accepted self-
determination as a right of peoples in non-self-governing territories. 135 Self-
determination was just a more appealing term for decolonization. So, generally,
Am.U.L.Rev. 1,48(1982)
133 Richard N. Kiwanuka supra, note 76, 81
134
Rapporteur's Report, OAU Doc. CM/1 149 (XXXVII), Ann.l, at 4, para. 13 (1981). Quoted in Richard
N. Kiwanuka, supra, note 76.
135 Louis Henkin et al., International Law: Cases and Materials 203 (1993)
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"people" does not apply to sovereign independent states or to a section of a people or
nation.
Since World War II in particular, the world has ordered its affairs with an
international system based on the concept of states whose borders, no matter how they
were originally determined, are considered inviolable. Consequently, the right to
secession has not been recognized in international law. Neither is the right prohibited by
international law.
136
However, Africa has a peculiar problem. Most of the countries were arbitrarily
created by the European colonial powers. This was an area where the ingenuity of the
African traditional system and its conciliatory nature could have been useful. Even
though the African countries are now leaning towards having an African Court of
Human and Peoples' Rights, it was on the grounds of that conciliatory nature that the
Banjul Charter did not originally provide for a court. In view of the facts that Africa was
at the tail-end of the decolonization process at that time and that there were a lot of
oppressed peoples within the independent African states, the Banjul Charter should have
expressly defined "people" to include peoples within a state.
In the true African spirit of conciliation, the Charter should have specified an
African procedure for the peaceful breaking-up of states which oppress their peoples.
Czechoslovakia was able to do it peacefully. If there is a need for military intervention,
this should be done under the auspices of the OAU or a sub-regional organization like
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This would be a
136 Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 Va.J.Int'I L. 1, 42 (1993). See also Tom Franck,
Postmodern Tribalism and The Right to Secession, in Peoples and Minorities in International Law 1,19
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necessary departure from the general principle of non-intervention by other states in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. This
arrangement could have provided a means of rapid intervention to prevent the pogroms
that have occurred in Rwanda and other countries.
Whatever happens in one African country is likely to affect at least the
neighboring countries directly or indirectly. Such events can also trigger off similar
occurrences even in non-neighboring African countries. When Idi Amin was having a
field day in Uganda in the 1970's, a lot of Nigerians thought that such a leader could not
thrive in Nigeria. Nigeria has since had a leader named Ibrahim Babangida. She was
even unlucky a second time to have another named Sanni Abacha. No country is
immune from such leaders. The only way to prevent the rise of such evil leaders in the
future is to crack down on those that have reared their ugly heads.
Tanzania, under Julius Nyerere, intervened militarily to free the people of
Uganda from Idi Amin's oppressive rule. The West African states, through the
ECOMOG, have also intervened militarily in Liberia and Sierra Leone to restore order.
A useful guide as to what "people" means is the Algiers Declaration of 1976 13
which was proposed by a group of eminent individuals meeting in Algiers. Article 7 of
the Declaration, amplifying the democratic as against the state-centric content of self-
determination, states:
Every people has the right to have democratic government representing
all the citizens without distinction as to race, sex, belief, or colour and
capable of ensuring effective respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all. 137
(Catherine Brolmann et al., 1993).
137
Universal Declaration on the Rights of Peoples, IODC Bull., 47 International Documentation Center,
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African leaders should realize, as Professor Ralph Steinhardt has observed, that
claims to self-determination usually indicate a human rights problem in its final
stages.
138 They should, therefore, address complaints about human rights violations
before they reach this stage. That would help to reduce the number of wars on the
continent and bring about peace, stability, and rapid development.
6. Right to Development
It is not our intention to discuss extensively the right to development in this
thesis. Suffice it to say, however, that the right was first enunciated by the President of
the Senegal Supreme Court, Keba M'Baye in an address to the International Institute of
Human Rights, Strasbourg in 1972. 139 He relied on Articles 55-56 of the UN Charter and
22-27 of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, as well as on statutes of
specialized agencies in which international cooperation and solidarity are important.
We are here concerned with the issue whether development efforts should take
precedence over human rights or not. Some African leaders have argued that respect for
human rights will have to wait until their countries have caught up with the developed
countries. Kwame Nkrumah, the first leader of Ghana wrote shortly after independence:
The economic independence that should follow and maintain political
independence demands every effort from the people, a total mobilization
of brain and manpower resources. What other countries have taken
three-hundred (300) years or more to achieve, a once dependent territory
must try to accomplish in a generation if it is to survive . . . [E]ven a
system of social justice and a democratic constitution may need backing
September 1976)
138 See Patricia Carley, Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession,
Report from a roundtable, 9 (U.S. Institute of Peace, Peaceworks No. 7, March, 1996)
139 Keba M'Baye, "Le Droit Development comme un Droit de I 'Homme", 5 Rev. Droit de l'Homme 623,
626 (1982). See U.O. Umozurike, supra, note 1 19, at 59
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up, during the period following independence by emergency measures of
a totalitarian kind.
140
African leaders have used this argument over the years to deny their people of
the opportunity to enjoy human rights. It has not helped their nations and the people
have been suffering unnecessarily. It has merely enabled the leaders to shirk their duty
to develop the countries while embezzling state funds meant for development
unchallenged. Without the right to freedom of expression, for example, it would be
difficult for the people to challenge a bad government. In Africa, as Colin Morris has
stated,
Governments don't feel shame, and it is government by the rich for the
rich that guards the gap between the Haves and Have-nots against
shrinkage during our lifetime or anyone else's short of bloody
revolution.
141
Quite apart from the fact that they have had the opportunity to put their
argument into practice and it has not helped Africa, African leaders must be told in no
uncertain terms that there is no room for double standards in the application ofhuman
rights. They were known for speaking up at the UN against the apartheid policy in
South Africa during the struggle against that country's policy but keeping quiet about
the human rights violations that they were inflicting on their fellow citizens. The
oppression ofman by man - be it black by white, white by white, white by black, or
140 Kwame Nkrumah, Autobiography (1959). Quoted in Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, supra, note 53, at 658-
9.
141 Colin Morris, The Unyoung, The Unpoor, and The Uncolored (1962). Quoted in George W. Shepherd,
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black by black - is wrong. In particular, it is un-African. As Hillary Clinton has rightly
observed, in Africa, the prevalent belief is that "it takes a village to raise a kid." 142
It is only when every individual is allowed to have a sense of belonging and
accorded all his or her rights that he or she will be loyal to the group or nation. It is then
that all members of the society can join hands together in producing meaningful
development.
It is for this reason that contemporary African leaders must de-emphasize
peoples' right to development as meaning the states' (or leaders') right to receive aids
from developed nations and to squander those aids as they like without regard for the
rights of the masses. "People" should include the individuals within an independent
state and the peoples' right to development should be emphasized to include the right of
individuals within the states to demand that governments perform the duty of providing
them with economic, social, and cultural development.
Jr., et al. (eds.), Emerging Rights: The African Political Economy Context, 41 (1990).
142
Hillary Clinton, It Takes a Village: and Other Lessons Children Teach Us (1996)
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
We have shown in this thesis that the concept ofhuman rights is universal.
Precolonial Africans knew both the concept of individual human rights and the concept
of group rights. The present state of human rights practice in Africa is deplorable. The
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is an instrument that is bound to help in
improving on the poor human rights situation in contemporary Africa.
The failure to provide for a court ofhuman rights has been an important
omission in the Charter. Luckily, the OAU is now making plans to amend the Charter to
provide for such a court. That is a step in the right direction.
It is also hoped that the organization will take steps to improve on some of the
other enforcement provisions and strengthen the Commission. The Commission should
have the power and means to apply publicity in appropriate cases in carrying out its
task.
However, no matter how good a law may be, its success depends on the people
who operate it. The African people will have to be vigilant about the observance of their
rights. The contemporary African leaders, in particular, will also need to respect their
peoples' rights as contained in the Charter. The much-talked-about development can
only come if they discard wicked policies that chase away the best minds among their
citizens from those countries. Talking of the relevance of African values, it is un-
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African to siphon the peoples' money to private bank accounts in foreign countries. The
precolonial African leaders never engaged themselves in such a wicked practice.
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